The United States between Intervention and Diplomacy

Andrew Spannaus, prepared remarks/notes for the conference:

“The Tensions in the Middle East and the Prospects for Resolution of the Syrian Crisis”

Sala delle Colonne, Palazzo Marini (Chamber of Deputies)

March 11, 2014

The United States between Intervention and Diplomacy

From Libya to Ukraine, the orientation of the Obama Administration in international crises. 

Good evening. I would like to thank the organizers of this event for inviting me to speak and participate.

First of all, I would like to say a few words on the economic aspect of the issue, in relation to the strategic situation. The Western policy of expansion, including military expansion, in my view actually indicates a weakness: for years we have implemented a policy that has weakened the real economy, while promoting the financial economy. This leads to a loss of real influence in the world, which we try to compensate for with an attempt to maintain and expand influence in important areas of the world, for example up to the borders of Russia.

Therefore, when we look at the situation in Syria, we have to consider the strategic situation, and not consider Syria as a case on its own, but rather as an element of a broader process within U.S. foreign policy; and above all, this means looking at relations with Russia.

From this standpoint, I would like to go back to the time of the agreement reached last year for the destruction of Syria’s chemical weapons, which I believe represented a crucial point in time. That agreement could – or maybe could have, given subsequent developments – trigger a significant change in Western relations with the Middle East in general, and with Russia. This is because it removed the threat of another Western military intervention – at least temporarily – representing a return to diplomacy that also favored the emerging agreement with Iran on the nuclear issue.

Unfortunately though, this process, this hope for a beginning of a change in course, risks being crushed by the events around Ukraine, which are bringing the East-West strategic clash back to the fore, as pursued by certain factions in the past two decades.

To get back to the question of the agreement, at the beginning of September 2013, in response to the alleged chemical weapons attack in Ghouta by the Government of Bashar el-Assad, President Obama was ready to order the bombardment of government positions in Syria. In the previous months Obama had drawn a red line, wanting to show that he was decisive in response to criticism from the hawks. Words matter, and thus when the chemical attack was claimed to be confirmed, Obama thought that he had to intervene.

At the last minute, something changed. The President accepted Putin’s proposal for the removal of the chemical weapons. We don’t know exactly what caused this change, but the two leading factors were the opposition from the U.S. Congress, and that from the military institutions.

According to the well-known journalist Seymour Hersh – who initially became famous with his reporting on the My Lai massacre in Vietnam – there was a process of manipulation of the intelligence on Syria similar to what took place with Saddam Hussein’s famous “weapons of mass destruction.” Hersh also suggests that at a certain point Obama or some people around him may have realized that there was not overwhelming evidence and that the intelligence community and the pro-intervention advisors in his administration were pushing for a military strike with consequences that were hard to predict. At that point, the President apparently decided on an abrupt change of course, abandoning the plans for a military strike.

In my view, the agreement on the removal of the chemical weapons was very important, not because it resolved the Syrian question; to the contrary, the situation is disastrous for the population, and it is proving very difficult to make progress in the negotiations. It was important, rather, because it created the basis for cooperation between the great powers, rather than a further increase of tensions. This could lead to a change in the policy direction that has been in place for many years.

Before Obama came into office, there was the George W. Bush administration. After the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the neo-conservative policy had taken over Washington, with the war in Iraq and the conception of a “clean break” with the past to reorganize the situation in the Middle East, exporting democracy.

With the arrival of Barack Obama this was supposed to change. But it soon became clear that while the Republicans had the neo-cons, the Democrats had the interventionists who claim the “right to protect” – a concept promoted around the world by former British Prime Minister Tony Blair. (we all remember his role in the Iraq war, as well)

Obama has always listened to the advocates of this doctrine, giving key roles to Susan Rice and Samantha Power, for example, currently the National Security Advisor and the U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations, respectively.

Together with an intelligence community intent on pursuing the War on Terror with methods at the limit – and sometimes over the limit – of legality, the Obama Administration has not been very different from the Bush Administration.

There was the intervention in Libya, for example; a so-called humanitarian intervention, which in reality had been prepared ahead of time by certain external actors.

Then, in the name of fighting the enemy, we got mixed up with the opposition groups consisting of extremists and terrorists, many of whom then went to join the war against Assad in Syria, together with the affiliates of Al-Qaeda and other terrorist groups from Central Asia.

The exception to this policy is represented by the efforts of the U.S. Administration to reach an agreement with Iran. Obama had promised during the 2007-2008 election campaign that he would pursue that opening, and made a first attempt in 2009, which however came up empty due to numerous factors, from conflicts within the Administration itself, to the role of certain European countries such as France and Great Britain, and also the clash and repression within Iran itself.

Starting at the end of 2012, the efforts were re-started, leading to secret negotiations held in Oman for many months during 2013. Subsequently, the other countries in the P5+1 – the five permanent members of the UN Security Council plus Germany – were involved, and a preliminary agreement was reached.

Here as well, the road was not, and will not, be easy. There is a great deal of pressure coming from the U.S. Congress, led by AIPAC; for the moment, this appears to have been stymied.

France also made certain requests at the last minute that risked blowing up the deal.

And then there is the opposition from Israel and Saudi Arabia. The governments of these countries are against the agreement, and for now do not seem to be in favor of a shift towards diplomacy and cooperation.

In the case of Israel, the desire to maintain a hard line against Iran is well-known, although it is notable that in recent weeks there seem to have been some openings on the question from Israeli military and intelligence institutions.

Saudi Arabia, on the other hand, risks losing a great deal in the event of a change in direction. I have recently written about the role of the Saudis in financing extremist groups and their interest in maintaining a sort of strategy of tension. The Saudis fear that an agreement with Iran could represent the end of the special relationship with the West from which they have benefitted for decades. It’s quite a paradox: the West supports the country that has done more than any other to support the terrorist groups that attack the West itself. This is a mechanism that must be understood, and changed.

But let’s go back to September 2013. In his speech to the United Nations General Assembly a few days after the agreement on the removal of Syria’s chemical weapons, President Obama made an interesting statement. He said “As we pursue a settlement, let us remember that this is not a zero-sum endeavor. We’re no longer in a cold war. There’s no great game to be won…”

He spoke of the “Great Game,” the strategic clash represented historically by British military and intelligence operations to contrast Russia’s influence in Central Asia and the Middle East, from Afghanistan to the Ottoman Empire to Persia.

By aiming to deny the intention to continue with such a clash though, Obama actually confirmed that some people see the situation precisely in these terms, and that he is conscious of this fact; as well he should be, since a considerable portion of his Administration acts in that manner, and many of his own policies reflect this strategy.

It is precisely the new Great Game that defines the context in which the interventions and clashes take place in the entire area that Bernard Lewis would later define as the “Arc of Crisis,” the area that goes from North Africa to Central Asia.

For the Russians, the intervention in Libya represented a breaking point, leading them to react against the way in which Gaddafi was killed and how the Western countries moved in rapidly. One aspect of this response is that Russia helped Assad significantly, considering its own strategic interests in Syria, while warning against attempting a “Libyan” solution there as well.

So the question is: is the Great Game really over?

In foreign policy, words are one thing; actions are another. Obama can say that there is no Great Game, but what really counts is what other international actors perceive. Without the collaboration of outside countries, from Russia to Iran, it will be difficult to improve – not to mention resolve – the situation in Syria. If both parties continue to move from the standpoint of competing for zones of influence against the other, the same geopolitical game we have seen for decades will continue.

From this point of view, the situation in Ukraine becomes dominant, and risks taking us back to an East-West clash that in addition to the direct risk of escalation, could have consequences for the resolution of other situations of conflict, especially in the Middle East.

In Europe – including in the Italian Government – there is increasing awareness that the situation in Ukraine is complex, and should not be viewed with a simple representation of goods guys versus bad guys.

The peaceful protest of many Ukrainians who in good faith were pro-European, was exploited by violent and extreme groups – including openly neo-Nazi parties – to promote themselves and guarantee a change in regime that was illegal.

This is a script we have already seen before: on the one hand Russia intervened at times with both aid and pressure; on the other, Western governments and private groups spent billions of dollars over the years to promote revolts.

Taken together with the campaign for NATO expansion, we end up with an explosive mix. Russia, which saw a dramatic fall in its living conditions in the 1990s thanks to the hyper free-trade policies of Western economists, now feels encircled and responds by attempting to guarantee the presence of a buffer zone towards the West.

It should be noted that a party of realists is forming among geopolitical strategists, even including figures such as Henry Kissinger and Zbigniew Brzezinski, who in the past have done considerable work in advancing the Great Game. These figures say that the West must give up the idea of bringing Ukraine into NATO, rather than risk a clash at a level which everyone must avoid. It is certainly positive that they have singled out the question of NATO expansion as one of the principal factors driving the confrontation. However, this doesn’t mean we can trust these individuals, since they fail to admit the reality of the current policy pushing strategic confrontation; actually, they have been a part of the policy itself.

In any event, it is necessary to go beyond the idea of finding a way to manage specific points of crisis. In my view, it is also very important to reconsider our assumptions in economic policy, the real problem behind the clash. In the 1990s, immediately after the end of the Soviet Union, the Russians asked the West for help in rebuilding their economy. We sent them professors from Harvard and from the schools in London, to apply the recipe of shock therapy, which made the situation much worse than before. At the same time, over the past twenty years Western governments, along with various private groups and NGOs, have spent a tremendous amount of money to promote pro-democracy groups that aimed to overturn governments in the area. But the economic policy associated with this campaign is that of the International Monetary Fund, what [in Italy] we would call “structural reforms” today. What will we do to help Ukraine? Do we want to impose the type of reforms carried out in Greece? If the aid that we offer resembles the policies of austerity and the promotion of financial speculation that have characterized the interventions of the European Union and the United States in recent years, this will guarantee additional upheaval in the nearby future.

In conclusion, in order to address the role of the United States in Syria, we must think of what the real interests in play are: what is the ultimate aim of U.S. foreign policy, or European foreign policy, in the region? We need to be clear on the vision of the world, and avoid an attitude of confrontation.

I hope that it will be possible to resume the path towards dialogue and cooperation among all of the powers involved, building on the positive steps that took place in recent months. However, if we don’t deal with the general strategic context, it will be very difficult to achieve any progress in Syria. The confrontation underway between the West and Russia risks thwarting the recent efforts, and taking us all back to a dangerous situation from which could be very difficult to extricate ourselves.